



China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia

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Summary

In the past several years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has bolstered its diplomatic presence and garnered international goodwill through its financing of infrastructure and natural resource development projects, assistance in the carrying out of such projects, and large economic investments in many developing countries. This report examines China's economic impact in three regions — Africa, Latin America (Western Hemisphere), and Southeast Asia — with an emphasis on bilateral foreign assistance.

China's foreign aid is difficult to quantify. The PRC government does not release or explain Chinese foreign aid statistics and much of PRC foreign aid does not appear to be accounted for in the scholarly literature on foreign aid. Some Chinese foreign assistance partially resembles *official development assistance* (ODA) as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but in other aspects shares characteristics of foreign investment. In terms of development grants, the primary form of assistance provided by major OECD countries, China is a relatively small source of global aid. However, when China's concessional loans and state-sponsored or subsidized overseas investments are included, the PRC becomes a major source of foreign aid.

This report is based on research done by the New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service in 2007-2008. The Wagner School study, while not comprehensive, suggests a dramatic increase in PRC foreign aid and related activity. According to the research, which is largely based upon news reports of Chinese foreign economic activity, PRC foreign assistance and government-supported economic projects in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia grew from less than \$1 billion in 2002 to \$27.5 billion in 2006 and \$25 billion in 2007. Aid and related investment to Africa showed the most significant increase. These totals, however, should be interpreted with caution. Some aggregate values may be inflated: Some PRC loans or aid pledges may not have been fulfilled and some aid pledges that include multiple projects or that span several years may have been counted more than once. Some PRC investment activities may more closely resemble FDI than aid. In other ways, totals may be undervalued, such as when economic projects or data have not been reported or when the values of Chinese materials and labor have not been included.

Overall, China's foreign assistance during the past several years has been driven primarily by Beijing's desire to secure and transport natural resources and secondarily for diplomatic reasons. According to the NYU Wagner School study, during the 2002-2007 period, Africa received the greatest amount of loans and development assistance, followed by Latin America and Southeast Asia. The study suggests that China's foreign aid activities in Africa and Latin America serve the PRC's immediate economic interests, while those in Southeast Asia relate to longer term diplomatic or strategic objectives. In Africa and Southeast Asia, Chinese infrastructure and public works projects constitute the most common form of aid, while in Latin America, where some countries are more developed, PRC-sponsored natural resource development activities are more prominent.

China is fast becoming a top trading partner to Africa and Southeast Asia, and it is second to the United States as a market for Latin American commodities and goods. Although the PRC's aid projects are a highly visible reminder of China's growing "soft power," other countries and regions, such as the European Union, the United States, and Japan, continue to dominate foreign direct investment in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. This report will not be updated.

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Introduction

This report examines China's aid-related activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.¹ In the past several years, China's growing "soft power" — primarily diplomatic and economic influence in the developing world — has become a concern among many U.S. foreign policy leaders, including Members of Congress.² One of the most important ways in which the People's Republic of China (PRC) has bolstered its economic presence and garnered international goodwill has been through its offers of financing or concessional loans for infrastructure projects, large economic investments, and the signing of trade agreements. Many observers have praised Chinese aid and investment as filling unmet development needs, particularly in countries that have been relatively neglected by major aid donors. Others have criticized China for failing to promote democracy, equitable and sustainable development, and environmental preservation in these countries. Some U.S. policy-makers and others have expressed frustration that because of China's policy of providing foreign assistance without conditions, they are losing the ability to influence the behaviors of aid recipients regarding human rights and economic reforms. Some reports indicate, however, that PRC foreign aid, investment, and trade activities may begin to contract as the global economic crisis unfolds.

Measuring China's Foreign Aid

PRC foreign assistance is difficult to quantify. Still a developing country itself, China appears to administer foreign aid in an ad hoc fashion, without a centralized system, foreign aid agency and mission, or regularized funding schedule.³ Nor does Beijing publicly release foreign aid-related data. Some analysts surmise that the Chinese leadership is reluctant to be perceived as a major aid donor, since the PRC itself continues to be a recipient of foreign assistance and because the government fears that its citizens may object to lavish spending on economic projects abroad.

Estimates of China's foreign assistance, which consists mainly of concessional or low-interest loans and government-backed or subsidized investments in infrastructure and natural resources, vary widely due to the different definitions of aid. A relatively small portion of Chinese aid includes what typically is characterized as "official development assistance" (ODA) by the world's major aid donors, such as development grants, humanitarian assistance, social welfare programs, and food aid. China also provides relatively little military and security-related assistance. Few of China's foreign aid activities fit the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) definition of ODA — "flows of official financing to developing countries provided by official agencies which have a clear development or anti-poverty purpose and are at least partially concessional in nature," with a grant element of at least 25%.⁴

¹ This report is based on research done by the New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008. For questions or further information, please contact Thomas Lum of the Congressional Research Service who served as project manager for this study.

² For a discussion of China's soft power, see CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, section by Thomas Lum.

³ Carol Lancaster, "The Chinese Aid System," Center for Global Development, June 2007 <http://www.cgdev.org>.

⁴ OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm>.

China's aid projects to a large extent serve its own development needs, facilitating the export of raw materials to China, and requiring that 50% of project materials and services are to be sourced in the PRC. By contrast, the foreign aid programs of the United States, European countries, and most other major aid donors are not directly or strongly linked to their own economies. Furthermore, they often include objectives or conditions related to political development and democratic reform. Among OECD countries, Japan's history of ODA, with its relatively large loan component (from 60% in the mid-1990s to roughly 25% a decade later),⁵ emphasis on infrastructure projects, and links to its own economy, may come closest to providing a model for China's foreign assistance.⁶

China reportedly has taken some tentative steps toward making its foreign aid process more centralized and transparent, coordinating its programs with other aid providers, and offering more development-oriented assistance, while continuing to eschew the label of major ODA donor. The PRC has begun sending abroad "youth volunteers," similar to U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, engaged in teaching and training in such subjects as Chinese language and medicine, computer skills, agricultural technologies, and sports.⁷

Many forms of Chinese foreign assistance that are included in this report share only some characteristics with traditional development assistance as provided by major aid donors, and have often been overlooked in the literature on global foreign aid. Although they often do not fit the OECD's narrow definition of development assistance, many of China's economic activities in developing countries are supported by the PRC government and provide benefits to recipient countries that otherwise may not be available. Furthermore, many PRC economic investments abroad can be counted as aid rather than foreign direct investment (FDI) because they are secured by official bilateral agreements, do not impose real financial risks upon the PRC companies involved, or do not result in Chinese ownership of foreign assets. See **Table 1**.

⁵ Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007; "Japan Urged to Improve Quality of Foreign Aid," *Inter Press Service News Agency*, August 18, 2005; "Japan and Asia: Developing Ties," *OECD Observer*, 2008; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶ Edward J. Lincoln, "Japan: Using Power Narrowly," Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2003.

⁷ China reportedly has youth volunteers in 50 countries, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia, and has begun to send volunteers to Latin America. The Chinese government has pledged to send 300 volunteers to Africa by 2009. "China to Send Youth Volunteers to Africa this Year," *The Ethiopian Herald*, February 17, 2007.

Table 1. Similarities and Differences between OECD-Defined “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) and “Chinese Aid”

	Government to Government	Financing through Development Agency	Strong Links to Donor Country Economy	Concessional or Favorable Lending Terms	Receives Payment of Debt in Kind	Grant Element of at Least 25%	Private or Corporate Financing
OECD Aid Donor	yes ^a	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
China	yes	no ^b	yes ^c	yes	yes ^d	no	no

Sources: Penny Davies, “China and the End of Poverty in Africa,” August 2007; “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa,” The World Bank, No. 5 (2008).

- a. Grants may be awarded to NGOs based in either the donor country or recipient country.
- b. PRC aid is provided largely in the form of concessional loans administered by the China Eximbank.
- c. Aid projects facilitate the export of natural resources and commodities to China and utilize PRC companies, materials, and labor.
- d. In some cases, aid recipients make payments on loans from China with oil or minerals.

Many estimates of China’s foreign assistance in PRC official publications and in the existing scholarly literature do not appear to capture much of PRC aid activity. The *China Statistical Yearbook 2003-06* reportedly released an annual aid figure of \$970 million. According to other sources, annual PRC foreign assistance ranges from \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion.⁸ These figures would place China’s aid levels comparable to those of Australia, Belgium, or Denmark.⁹ However, many analysts, applying more flexible definitions of foreign aid, consider actual PRC aid numbers to be far higher. Some of the discrepancy may be caused by regarding many Chinese economic activities abroad as foreign investment rather than aid. In 2006 and 2007, according to various sources referring to PRC official statistics, China’s annual FDI outflows totaled roughly \$21 billion annually.¹⁰ Counting some of these outflows as aid would raise PRC foreign assistance estimates; however, doing so also would lower calculations of China’s outward investment levels, which are small compared to those of the United States (\$216 billion in 2006).

The NYU Wagner School study on China’s foreign aid tabulated PRC foreign assistance and related activities — pledges of aid or loans and government-sponsored investment projects — that had been reported in 62 African, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries between 2001 and 2008. In 2007, the last full year for which Chinese aid-related activities were examined in the study, the Wagner School research team found projects worth up to \$25 billion in aggregate. Of this amount, \$16.6 billion, or 66%, was provided in the form of loans (concessional

⁸ Lancaster, op. cit.; See also Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2006.

⁹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data. See <http://www.globalissues.org/>.

¹⁰ CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China’s and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, op. cit., section by Dick Nanto; “Chinese Investment Pouring into Thailand’s Neighbors,” *The Nation (Thailand)*, December 4, 2007.

loans or credit lines), \$7.2 billion, or 29%, represented state-sponsored investment, and the remaining 5% included grants, debt cancellation or debt relief, and in-kind aid.¹¹

Although the NYU Wagner School study strongly indicates that China has been providing significant and growing amounts of economic assistance to developing countries — if not ODA as defined by the OECD — the totals should be interpreted with caution. Some values may be inflated: Many loans represent offers or pledges that may not have been fulfilled; some projects have been cancelled; some aid endeavors involving several activities or taking several years to complete may have been counted more than once; and some PRC investments that were counted as aid may actually be FDI. In other ways, however, totals may be undervalued, such as when projects or data have not been reported or when Chinese materials and labor have not been included.

In terms of official development assistance as defined by the OECD, United States ODA is the largest among OECD member countries, followed by Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The United States' foreign operations budget (bilateral development, economic, security, and military assistance, multilateral assistance, and food aid) was estimated at \$24 billion in FY2008.¹²

China's Foreign Aid Impact

In addition to their actual monetary value, Chinese assistance and related economic activities often garner appreciation disproportionate to their size, for several reasons:

- They often are made available relatively quickly and easily — without the political, economic, social, and environmental conditions and safeguards and bureaucratic procedures that major OECD aid donors, multilateral financial institutions, and multinational corporations typically impose.¹³
- China often promotes economic projects in countries, areas, and sectors that developed country governments and multinational corporations have avoided because they have determined them to be unfriendly, too arduous, or infeasible.
- Many PRC funded or built public works in foreign countries, such as national cultural centers, stadiums, and highways, are highly visible and provide tangible, short-term benefits.
- Such aid and investment activities are often announced at bilateral summit meetings with great fanfare, powerfully symbolizing the friendship between China and other developing countries.

¹¹ Because of the lack of official data, either from China or recipient countries, the NYU Wagner School research team relied largely upon the international press and scholarly research. Sources included allAfrica.com, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), International Relations and Security Network, the PRC Ministry of Commerce, ReliefWeb (United Nations), Reuters, Xinhua, and other news agencies.

¹² CRS Report RL34552, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2009 Appropriations*, by Susan B. Epstein and Kennon H. Nakamura.


¹³ China's conditions on aid are often international rather than domestic — requiring aid recipients to support the “one-China” principle regarding Taiwan and China's agenda in the United Nations.

Major Findings of the NYU Wagner School Study

The NYU Wagner School research may serve as a basis for conducting further research and thinking about U.S. policy responses to China's growing foreign aid and investment. The study's findings are not meant to be exhaustive, but may suggest the broad contours and trajectory of Chinese aid and related activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia:

- China's foreign aid is driven primarily by the need for natural resources and secondarily by diplomatic objectives, such as the objectives of isolating Taiwan and garnering support in international organizations such as the United Nations. Beijing also aims to open up foreign markets for Chinese goods and help PRC companies invest, set up manufacturing plants, and develop markets overseas.
- Unlike major aid donors, China lacks a centralized aid agency affiliated with its foreign affairs ministry. PRC assistance consists primarily of concessional loans administered by the Ministry of Commerce through its Department of Aid to Foreign Countries. To lesser extents, the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also play roles.
- Reported Chinese aid activities to the three regions grew from \$1.5 billion in 2003 to \$27.5 billion in 2006 and \$25 billion in 2007. Africa received the largest year-on-year increases and showed the clearest growth trend. See **Figure 1** and **Table 2**.
- In terms of financing, the NYU Wagner research team found that most aid to the three regions is provided in the form of state-sponsored investment. During the 2002-2007 period, PRC government-backed investments made up 53% of reported aid activity, concessional loans constituted 42%, and grants and debt cancellations accounted for the remaining 5%. See **Figure 2** and **Table 3**.
- Of the loans, infrastructure projects, and other aid provided by China to the three regions between 2002 and 2007, 44% was allocated to Africa, 36% to Latin America, and 20% to Southeast Asia. See **Table 4**.
- During the same period (2002-2007), 44.5% of aid and investment was directed at the natural resources and agricultural sectors while 43% supported infrastructure development. See **Table 5**.

Figure 1. Reported PRC Aid by Year and Region, 2003-2007



Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.


Table 2. Reported PRC Aid by Year, 2002-2007

(Million US\$)

Year	Total Aid
2002	51
2003	1,482
2004	10,485
2005	10,106
2006	27,518
2007	25,098

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

Figure 2. Reported PRC Foreign Aid by Funding Source

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

Table 3. Reported PRC Aid by Funding Source and Region, 2002-2007
(Million US\$)

	Africa	Latin America	Southeast Asia
Govt.-Sponsored Investment	8,042	24,389	7,429
Concessional Loan	22,379	1,950	7,114
Grant	1,851	421	231
Debt Cancellation	850	0	60
In-kind Aid	21	1	0

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

Table 4. Reported PRC Aid by Year and Region, 2002-2007

(Million US\$)

	Africa	Latin America	Southeast Asia
2002	10	4	36
2003	838	1	644
2004	2,292	7,000	1,193
2005	2,953	2,931	4,221
2006	9,088	16,425	2,004
2007	17,962	401	6,735

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

Table 5. Reported PRC Aid by Type and Region, 2002-2007

(Million US\$)

	Africa	Latin America	Southeast Asia
Natural Resources Extraction/Production	9,432	18,585	4,788
Infrastructure/Public Works	17,865	7,535	6,438
Not Specified/Other	5,024	608	2,276
Humanitarian	802	32	159
Military	4	0	170
Technical Assistance	10	1	3

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Notes: Annual totals represent announced loans and other reported aid and economic projects using PRC financing.

Regional Highlights

Africa

In the past several years, China's aid to Africa has grown dramatically. During the 1970s and 1980s, China provided assistance in the form of infrastructure projects, public works, technical and public health assistance, and scholarships to study in China. Its motivations were largely diplomatic: to forge friendships among "non-aligned" nations and to compete with Taiwan (the Republic of China) for recognition. Only four of 48 sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Sao Tome, Gambia, and Swaziland) still maintain official relations with Taiwan. In 2007, China reportedly offered Malawi aid and investment worth \$6 billion in major economic sectors. In January 2008, Malawi switched diplomatic relations to the PRC. However, in 2008, China reportedly offered Malawi only \$287 million in aid.¹⁴ While traditional types of aid activities remain staples of Chinese assistance in the region, many of them now complement much grander development projects that serve China's direct economic interests.¹⁵

According to some of the more conservative definitions and estimates, China's foreign aid on the continent ranges from roughly \$1.4 billion annually to \$2.7 billion, with outstanding concessional loans of \$8 billion-\$9 billion.¹⁶ More inclusive totals from the World Bank and PRC government refer to "infrastructure financing" (\$7 billion) and "economic cooperation" (\$9.5 billion) in Africa in 2006.¹⁷ In 2007, the China Development Bank reportedly set up a \$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund to finance infrastructure, industrial, and agricultural projects.¹⁸ The NYU Wagner School research team found PRC aid and state-sponsored investment projects in Africa reported during the 2002-2007 period that amounted to several billion dollars annually (\$6.6 billion on average). These aid activities included financing (concessional loans), grants, debt cancellations, and economic investments. However, as explained above, these totals may be inflated or represent the high end of a possible range of estimates.

The following data from OECD countries provide an indication of ODA levels to Africa. They are not meant to be directly compared to estimates of Chinese assistance to the region, which are based upon different definitions of aid. U.S. assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, the second-largest regional recipient of U.S. foreign assistance after the Near East and the largest recipient of U.S. development assistance, totaled an estimated \$5.2 billion in 2008 and \$4.7 billion in 2007.¹⁹ The

¹⁴ Pilirani Semu-Banda, "NGO Keeping an Eye on Malawi's New Best Friend, China," Inter Press Service News Agency, May 26, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/>; Mabvuto Banda, "Malawi Leader Says China to Give \$287 Min in Aid," *Reuters News*, April 4, 2008.

¹⁵ For further discussion of Chinese influence in Africa, see Congressional Research Service, "China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa: A Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate," April 2008, section by Nicolas Cook.

¹⁶ Deborah Brautigam, "China's Africa Aid," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, April 2008; Penny Davies, "China and the End of Poverty in Africa," August 2007; China Exim Bank.

¹⁷ Nick Tattersall, "Chinese Firm to Build \$1 Bln Road in Nigeria Oil Hub," *Reuters News*, July 13, 2008; China National Bureau of Statistics.

¹⁸ Tom Miller, "U.S. \$5 b Fund to Make First Forays into Africa," *South China Morning Post*, January 8, 2009.

¹⁹ Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2008.

United States, the United Kingdom, and France are the largest bilateral donors of ODA to Africa, providing \$5.8 billion, \$5.4 billion, and \$5.1 billion, respectively, in assistance in 2006.²⁰

Estimates of PRC direct investment in Africa range from under \$500 million to roughly \$1 billion annually. Historically, Europe (UK, France, and Germany), Japan, and the United States have been the principal sources of FDI on the continent. Some studies indicate that India has more cumulative investment in Africa (\$1.8 billion in 2004) than China (\$1.3 billion in 2005) and is a major source of infrastructure financing.²¹ According to some estimates, in 2005, Chinese FDI flows to Africa totaled \$392 million or 3% of total PRC outward investment.²² Other studies report that China had \$2.6 billion in cumulative FDI and over \$0.5 billion in annual investment in Africa in 2006. Higher estimates include figures of nearly \$1 billion in PRC annual direct investment in Africa during 2000-2006.²³ By contrast, in 2006, the United States reportedly invested \$1.5 billion in Africa out of a total of \$36 billion in global FDI received by Africa that year.²⁴ OECD countries reportedly pledged \$5 billion in ODA for infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2006.²⁵

China has exerted growing influence as a trading partner. As part of its integrated approach, China's diplomatic outreach to the region is accompanied by aid, investment, and trade. China is Africa's third largest trading partner after the European Union and the United States.²⁶ PRC-Africa trade reportedly was worth \$106.6 billion in 2008 compared to U.S.-Africa trade of \$142 billion.²⁷

China's aid to Africa is driven largely by its objective of securing access to oil and minerals for its growing economy. African oil reportedly accounts for 80% of China's trade in the region and about one-third of its oil imports.²⁸ Nearly 70% of PRC infrastructure financing on the continent reportedly is concentrated in Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sudan, all of which have oil fields.²⁹ Angola, Congo, and Sudan have major oil fields and pay for much of their assistance or loans from China with oil. Sudan reportedly sends 60% of its crude oil to China.³⁰ However, Europe and the United States remain the largest buyers of African petroleum (33% and 36% of Africa's

²⁰ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD and Africa*, March 2008.

²¹ "U.S.-African Trade Profile," U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (2008); Harry G. Broadman, "China and India Go to Africa," *Free Republic*, March 16, 2008.

²² Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma, "China's Outward FDI: Past and Future," July 2007; Jian-Ye Wang, "What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa," IMF Working Paper, October 2007; Mauro De Lorenzo, "China and Africa: A New Scramble?" *American Enterprise Institute*, April 6, 2007.

²³ Jian-Ye Wang, "What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa," op. cit.

²⁴ Hany Besada, Yang Wang, and John Whalley, "China's Growing Economic Presence in Africa," *Policy Brief*, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, No. 6 (October 2008); CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, op. cit., section by Dick Nanto (data excludes Egypt).

²⁵ "Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa," The World Bank, No. 5 (2008); China National Bureau of Statistics.

²⁶ Jian-Ye Wang and Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane, "Africa's Burgeoning Ties with China," *Finance and Development*, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/03/wang.htm>.

²⁷ World Trade Atlas.

²⁸ Building Bridges, op. cit.; "Africa Accounts For 30 Percent Of China's Oil Imports: Official," *People's Daily Online*, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn>, October 19, 2006.

²⁹ "Building Bridges," op. cit.

³⁰ Stephanie Hanson, "China, Africa, and Oil," *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder*, June 6, 2008.

oil exports, respectively).³¹ Estimates of China's share of the African oil market range from 10%-16%, although the PRC reportedly plays a larger role in the continent's minerals markets.³² See **Table 6**.

China's aid to Africa is dominated by concessional loans and export credits provided through the Ministry of Commerce and Eximbank. PRC loans to Africa, which reportedly grew by 35% annually between 2001 and 2005, have been used chiefly to finance infrastructure projects in over 35 African countries (mainly hydropower and transportation).³³ See **Table 7**. The NYU Wagner School research team compiled a list of PRC aid and related investment projects or offers in Africa reported during the 2002-2007 period. The combined values amounted to \$33 billion.³⁴ In dollar terms, 54% was related to infrastructure and other public works projects, 28.5% to the extraction or production of natural resources, and 2.5% to humanitarian activities, technical assistance, and military assistance (15% was unspecified). In many cases, especially when the recipient country has poor credit, loans are to be repaid in kind (oil or commodities). The China Eximbank reported in 2007 that its outstanding loans to the continent totaled \$8 billion-\$9 billion.³⁵ According to the Wagner School study, examples of PRC development and humanitarian aid in the region include the construction of schools and hospitals, medical training and equipment, agricultural technical assistance, food aid, and disaster assistance.

³¹ Zong He, "Some Responses to the 'China Threat in Africa,'" *China Daily*, November 7, 2007.

³² "Building Bridges," op. cit.

³³ "Building Bridges," op. cit.; Brautigam, "China's Africa Aid," op. cit.; World Bank, "Press Release: New Financiers are Narrowing Africa's Infrastructure Deficit," July 10, 2008.

³⁴ This aggregate number may include some double counting of aid that involved multiple projects or spanned several years. The figure is not based upon a precise definition of aid and does not represent an exact aid total.

³⁵ Davies, "China and the End of Poverty in Africa," op. cit.

Table 6. Selected African Countries with Large Reported Aid and Investment Projects, 2002-2007

Country	Main Exports to China	Pledged Aid, Loans, Credit Lines, and Investments	Major Types of Financing (as Reported)	Major Types of Projects Financed (as Reported)
Angola ^{a b c}	oil	\$7.4 billion	loans, interest-free loans, credit lines	infrastructure (railways)
Congo (DRC) ^{a b c}	oil, minerals	\$5 billion	loans	infrastructure, mining
Sudan ^{a b c}	oil	\$4.2 billion	investment, loans, grants	oil refining; infrastructure, hydro power, humanitarian
Gabon ^d	oil, minerals	\$3 billion	investment, grants	iron ore mining, infrastructure, port facilities, hydro power
Mozambique	wood, ores	\$2.4 billion	debt cancellation, concessional loans, grants	dam construction, infrastructure, national stadium
Equatorial Guinea ^{b c}	oil	\$2 billion	concessional loans, credit lines	not specified
Ethiopia	oil drilling rights	\$2 billion (includes 2008 aid of \$150 million)	loans, grants, investment	infrastructure, telecommunications, public buildings, hydropower, light industry
Nigeria ^{a b}	oil	\$1.6 billion	debt cancellation, investment, grants	offshore oil development, infrastructure (railways), medical training

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

- a. major African trading partner of China
- b. loan payments in oil
- c. major African oil supplier of China
- d. loan payments in minerals

Table 7. Selected Major PRC Financing and Aid-Related Economic Projects in Africa

Amount	Funding (Year)	Project Type(s)	Country
\$5 billion	loan (2007)	transportation infrastructure	Congo
\$4 billion	investment (2007)	oil production	Sudan
\$3 billion	investment (2006)	port, railway, hydropower, mining (iron)	Gabon
\$2.5 billion	loan (credit line) (2007)	unspecified	Angola
\$2.3 billion	loan (2006)	hydropower (dam)	Mozambique
\$2 billion	loan (credit line) (2006)	unspecified	Equatorial Guinea
\$2 billion	loan (credit line) (2004)	unspecified	Angola

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Latin America

China's growing engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (the Western Hemisphere) lacks the deep historical ties of its relations with Southeast Asia and legacy of its Cold War friendships in Africa. China's growing interest in the region appears to be principally linked to its objective of gaining broader access to natural resources and agricultural commodities, such as oil, ores, and soybeans. Beijing also aims to fully isolate Taiwan — 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan — and bolster China's diplomatic presence in the region. China's recent aid to Costa Rica reportedly was directly linked to the Central American country's establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC (and termination of relations with Taiwan) in 2007. Other goals include opening up alternative markets and opportunities for Chinese goods and investment. According to many analysts, however, Beijing acknowledges that the United States remains the dominant economic and political influence in the Western Hemisphere.³⁶

The PRC is not a major foreign investor in the region. The European Union (EU) is the largest source of FDI in Latin America, with \$620 billion invested in the region in 2006, followed by the United States with \$350 billion. According to PRC official data, Latin America had received \$22 billion in cumulative PRC investment at the end of 2006, about 25% of PRC total overseas investment. However, the vast majority of PRC FDI in the region reportedly goes to off-shore financial havens such as the Cayman Islands and the Virgin Islands, to be reinvested in China (thereby taking advantage of tax breaks for "foreign companies"). When these destinations are

³⁶ Peter Brookes, "Russia, China, Move In on Latin America," Heritage Foundation, November 27, 2008; Cynthia A. Watson, "U.S. Responses to China's Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere," in *Enter the Dragon? China's Presence in Latin America*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 2007. For further discussion of Chinese influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, see Congressional Research Service, "China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa," op. cit., section by Mark P. Sullivan.

excluded, only about \$1.9 billion remains.³⁷ According to some sources, in 2006, PRC direct investment flows to the Western Hemisphere totaled roughly \$100 million, less than its outbound investment to Africa (\$500 million).³⁸ Conversely, Latin American companies have made sizable investments in China with \$20 billion in cumulative FDI.³⁹

China's trade with Latin America grew ten-fold between 2000 and 2007 and reached \$142 billion in 2008. China's total trade with the region is only about one-fifth that of the United States (\$664 billion in 2008), but growing at a faster rate.⁴⁰ The United States reportedly imports 12 times more oil from Venezuela than does China.⁴¹ Nonetheless, China has become an important trading partner to major countries in the region, and is second only to the United States as an importer of commodities and goods from Latin America. China's largest trading partners in the region are Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Peru.⁴²

The NYU Wagner School research team compiled a list of PRC aid and related investment projects or offers in the Western Hemisphere reported during the 2002-2007 period. The combined values amounted to \$26.7 billion.⁴³ Over two-thirds of these projects were in natural resource sectors, while 28% were related to infrastructure and public works, 1% involved humanitarian activities and technical assistance, and 2% of aid was unspecified. In the past several years, Chinese humanitarian assistance has included infrastructure repair in Costa Rica, hospitals in Cuba, funding to the Bolivian Red Cross for mudslide victims, and help to people affected by an earthquake in Peru and flood in Uruguay. In 2008, China joined the Inter American Development Bank and committed \$350 million for public and private sector projects.⁴⁴ The emphasis on natural resources implies a strongly commercial nature to China's aid in Latin America, less oriented toward infrastructure development than China's foreign assistance to Africa and Southeast Asia. See **Table 8** and **Table 9**.

In terms of official development assistance as measured by the OECD, which often refers to different types of aid than that typically provided by China, the EU, the United States, and Japan are the largest providers in the region. U.S. foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere, including regional assistance, was an estimated \$1.46 billion in 2008 and \$1.55 billion in 2007.⁴⁵

³⁷ Daniel P. Erikson, "The New Challenge: China and the Western Hemisphere," Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 11, 2008.

³⁸ CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, op. cit., section by Dick Nanto.

³⁹ Erikson, "The New Challenge," op. cit.

⁴⁰ Frank Bajak, "Slowdown Doesn't Shrink China's LatAm Ambitions," *Associated Press*, November 17, 2008; World Trade Atlas.

⁴¹ CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, op. cit., section by Dick Nanto.

⁴² He Li, "China's Growing Interest in Latin America," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4-5 (August-October 2007); Global Trade Atlas.

⁴³ This aggregate number may include some double counting of aid that involved multiple projects or spanned several years. The figure is not based upon a precise definition of aid and does not represent an exact aid total.

⁴⁴ "China Makes IDB Aid Commitment to Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras," *BBC Monitoring Americas*, October 23, 2008.

⁴⁵ Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2008.

Table 8. Selected Latin American Countries with Large Reported Aid and Investment Projects, 2002-2007

Country	Main Exports to China	Pledged Aid, Loans, Credit Lines, and Investments	Major Types of Financing (as Reported)	Major Types of Projects Financed (as Reported)
Venezuela	oil	\$16.4 billion	investment	oil, gas exploration and production; transportation; telecom; light industry
Brazil	iron ore, agricultural commodities, oil	\$8.2 billion	investment, loans	infrastructure (ports, aviation, rail)
Chile	minerals, ores	\$0.5 billion	investment	natural resources (copper)
Columbia	iron, oil	\$0.4 billion	investment	steel,, oil exploration,, mining
Costa Rica	electrical machinery	\$0.4 billion	grants, loans	humanitarian, infrastructure

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Table 9. Selected Major PRC Financing and Aid-Related Economic Projects in Latin America

Amount	Funding (Year)	Project Type(s)	Country
\$9 billion	investment (2006)	infrastructure (railways), telecom, mining, agriculture	Venezuela
\$7 billion	investment (2004)	infrastructure (port, railways, aviation), steel	Brazil
\$5 billion	investment (2006)	energy	Venezuela

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Southeast Asia

China has become an important source of infrastructure financing in Southeast Asia. While China is not counted as a major regional provider of ODA as defined by the OECD, some reports and observations suggest that the PRC is one of the largest sources of economic assistance in Southeast Asia. Although access to natural resources plays a prominent role in China's engagement in the region, strategic interests are likely to influence China's activities in Southeast

Asia to a greater extent than they do in Africa and Latin America. Many of China's aid activities in the region appear to provide relatively greater long-term diplomatic benefits and comparatively few short-term economic ones.

China has a large economic presence in Southeast Asia, owing in part to its proximity and historical ties to the region. Southeast Asia's largest sources of FDI in 2006 (net inflow) were the EU (\$13.3 billion), Japan, (\$10.8 billion), the United States (\$3.8 billion), South Korea (\$1 billion), and China (\$900 million).⁴⁶ The EU, the United States, Japan, and China are the largest trading entities in the region. In 2008, China's trade with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, at \$230 billion, was larger than its trade with Africa (\$106 billion) and Latin America (\$142 billion).⁴⁷

China and the least developed countries of mainland Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly economically integrated, although each of these countries also has sought to hedge against the PRC's rising influence. China is considered the "primary supplier of economic and military assistance" to Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, and Laos and provides them with an "implicit security guarantee," according to some analysts.⁴⁸ In recent years, PRC government entities have financed many infrastructure, energy-related (especially hydro power), agricultural, and other high profile development projects in these countries, which also rely upon Chinese construction materials, equipment, technical expertise, and labor. There are some indications that Chinese aid in this part of the region is diversifying, including support for counter-trafficking in persons and counter-narcotics efforts, programs involving Chinese youth volunteers (Laos), elections (Cambodia), and historical preservation (Cambodia). The PRC also has financed railway construction, hydro power development, and ship building facilities in Vietnam.⁴⁹

In the past few years, China has become a major financer and investor in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and mining in the Philippines. According to one source, in 2006, China was the third largest source of bilateral development assistance to the Philippines after Japan and the United Kingdom.⁵⁰ The Philippines reportedly is the largest recipient of PRC loans in Southeast Asia, which totaled \$2 billion in 2007, of which about half has been disbursed.⁵¹ One of the largest PRC-funded projects in the country is the \$1 billion North Rail line.⁵²

⁴⁶ ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment Database, August 2007.

⁴⁷ World Trade Atlas; "China, ASEAN become 4th-Largest Trade Partners," *Xinhua*, March 1, 2008. Data among different sources varies.

⁴⁸ Catherin E. Dalpino, "Consequences of a Growing China," *Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs*, June 7, 2005; Heritage Foundation, "Southeast Asia's Forgotten Tier: Burma, Cambodia and Laos," July 26, 2007; Marvin C. Ott, "Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America's Response?" *Strategic Forum*, October 1, 2006; Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," *Current History*, Vol. 105, no. 692 (September 2006).

⁴⁹ For further information, see CRS Report RL34620, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World*, op. cit., section by Bruce Vaughn, Thomas Lum, and Wayne Morrison.

⁵⁰ Michelle Remo, "RP Should Look to China for its Infra Funding Needs," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, March 9, 2008.

⁵¹ Katrice R. Jalbuena, "Ties with PRC, Now Most Important to RP, Also Involves Security Matters," *Manila Times*, June 29, 2008.

⁵² Walter Lohman, "Off the Rails in the Philippines," Heritage Foundation, Web Memo no. 1856, March 14, 2008; Darwin G. Amojelar, "Chinese Loans to RP Rising," *The Manila Times*, December 3, 2007.

The NYU Wagner School research team compiled a list of PRC aid and related investment projects or offers in Southeast Asia reported during the 2002-2007 period. The combined values amounted to \$14.8 billion.⁵³ Of this amount, 43% was channeled toward infrastructure and public works projects, 32% to natural resource extraction or development, 3% to military, humanitarian, and technical assistance activities, and 22% to purposes not specified. See **Table 10** and **Table 11**.

In terms of official development assistance as measured by the OECD, which often refers to different types of aid than that typically provided by China, Japan remains the largest bilateral aid donor in Southeast Asia, providing \$2 billion in 2006.⁵⁴ The United States funded an estimated \$517 million in aid programs in Southeast Asian countries in 2008.⁵⁵ Since 2001, Indonesia and the Philippines have received the largest increases in U.S. foreign assistance in the region, chiefly for counter-terrorism programs. Vietnam has also received large increases in U.S. ODA, including significant funding for HIV/AIDS programs.

Table 10. Selected Southeast Asian Countries with Large Reported Aid and Investment Projects, 2002-2007

Country	Main Exports to China	Pledged Aid, Loans, Credit Lines, and Investments	Major Types of Financing (as Reported)	Major Types of Projects Financed (as Reported)
Philippines	ores, copper	\$5.4 billion	loans, grants	infrastructure (railways), mining, non-lethal military
Vietnam	oil, rubber, wood, ores	\$3.4 billion	loans, investment	infrastructure (power), shipyards, mining
Burma	wood, ores	\$3.1 billion	investment, loans	hydropower, nickel ore

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

⁵³ This aggregate number may include some double counting of aid that involved multiple projects or spanned several years. The figure is not based upon a precise definition of aid and does not represent an exact aid total.

⁵⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), <http://www.oecd.org/home/>.

⁵⁵ Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2008; Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007.

Table 11. Selected Major PRC Financing and Aid-Related Economic Projects in Southeast Asia

Amount	Funding (Year)	Project Type(s)	Country
\$2.4 billion	Investment (2005)	steel plant	Thailand
\$2 billion	Loan (2007)	infrastructure	Philippines
\$2 billion	Investment (2006-2007)	infrastructure, hydropower, oil pipeline	Burma
\$1.6 billion	Investment (2007)	mining	Vietnam
\$1 billion	Loan (2005)	power plant	Vietnam

Source: NYU Wagner School, *Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America*, April 25, 2008.

Appendix. Recent PRC Foreign Assistance and Investment Projects (2008)

Table A-1. Selected PRC Aid and Investment Projects in 2008 (Announced or Begun): Africa

Country	Type of Assistance or Investment	Funding Source	Description	Value in \$US (b = billion m = million)
Angola	Development	Govt-Sponsored Investment	housing and related infrastructure	\$3.5 b
Congo	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	optical cable network	\$35 m
Congo	Infrastructure/Public Works; Natural Resources	Govt-Sponsored Investment; Concessional Loan	transportation, mining sector	\$9 b
Ethiopia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant/Donation	construction of African Union Hall	\$150 m
Ethiopia	Infrastructure/Public Works	In-kind	vehicles and office equipment	not specified
Ethiopia	Infrastructure; Development	Govt-Sponsored Investment	industrial park	\$713 m
Gabon	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	hydroelectric dam	\$83 m
Kenya	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	road construction	\$120 m
Liberia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant; In-kind	hospital and medical supplies	\$10 m
Madagascar	Humanitarian; Development	Grant	medical aid team	not specified
Niger	Natural Resources	Govt-Sponsored Investment	oil drilling, refinery	\$5 b
Nigeria	Infrastructure/Public Works	Govt-Sponsored Investment	road construction	\$1 b
Nigeria	Infrastructure/Public Works	Govt-Sponsored Investment	power plant	\$2.4 b
Rwanda	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant	hospitals	\$1.5 m
Sierra Leone	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	telecommunications network	\$20 m
Sudan	Humanitarian	Grant; In-kind	de-mining training, mine sweeping equipment	not specified
Sudan	Humanitarian	Grant; In-kind	housing shelters, health equipment	\$11 m

Country	Type of Assistance or Investment	Funding Source	Description	Value in \$US (b = billion m = million)
Uganda	Military	Grant; In-kind	military training, trucks and equipment	not specified
Uganda	Development	Grant	upgrade health centers	\$15 m
Uganda	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant/Donation	government office complex	\$20 m
Zambia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Govt-Sponsored Investment; Concessional Loan	power station expansion	\$400 m
Zambia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant/Donation	sports stadium	\$65 m

Source: various international news reports

Table A-2. Selected PRC Aid and Investment Projects in 2008 (Announced or Begun): Latin America

Country	Type of Assistance or Investment	Funding Source	Description	Value in \$US (b = billion m = million)
Brazil	Infrastructure/Public Works	Govt-Sponsored Investment	power plant	\$850 m
Brazil	Natural Resources	Concessional Loan	oil exploration	\$10 b
Chile	Infrastructure/Public Works; Natural Resources	Concessional Loan (joint credit lines)	ports, shipping, mining	\$100 m
Costa Rica	Infrastructure/Public Works; Natural Resources	Grant/Donation	stadium, oil refinery	\$130 m
Cuba	Humanitarian	Concessional Loan	hurricane relief – repair of hospitals	\$70 m
Grenada	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	tourist marina	\$83 m
Venezuela	Infrastructure/Public Works; Development; Natural Resources	Concessional Loan	infrastructure, electricity, health, and education	\$4 b (to be paid back in oil)

Source: various international news reports

Table A-3. Selected PRC Aid and Investment Projects in 2008 (Announced or Begun): Southeast Asia

Country	Type of Assistance or Investment	Funding Source	Description	Value in \$US (b = billion m = million)
Cambodia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Grant; Concessional Loan	road construction	\$ 215 m
Laos/Thailand	Infrastructure/Public Works	Govt-Sponsored Investment	construction of China-Laos-Thailand railroad	\$3 b
Myanmar (Burma)	Natural Resources	Govt-Sponsored Investment	nickel mining	not specified (profit sharing arrangement)
Myanmar (Burma)	Natural Resources	Govt-Sponsored Investment	2 oil and gas pipelines	\$350 m
Indonesia	Infrastructure/Public Works	Concessional Loan	power plants	\$615 m

Source: various international news reports

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